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Abstract
Vulnerability studies can identify critical elements in electric power systems in order 
to take protective measures against possible scenarios that may result in load shedding, 
which can be caused by natural events or deliberate attacks. This article is a literature 
review on the latter kind, i.e., the interdiction problem, which assumes there is a 
disruptive agent whose objective is to maximize the damage to the system, while the 
network operator acts as a defensive agent. The non-simultaneous interaction of these 
two agents creates a multilevel optimization problem, and the literature has reported 
several interdiction models and solution methods to address it. The main contribution 
of this paper is presenting the considerations that should be taken into account to 
analyze, model, and solve the interdiction problem, including the most common solution 
techniques, applied methodologies, and future studies. This literature review found that 
most research in this area is focused on the analysis of transmission systems considering 
linear approximations of the network, and a few interdiction studies use an AC model of 
the network or directly treat distribution networks from a multilevel standpoint. Future 
challenges in this field include modeling and incorporating new defense options for the 
network operator, such as distributed generation, demand response, and the topological 
reconfiguration of the system.
Keywords: interdiction problem; multilevel optimization; power system vulnerability; 
power system resilience; power system optimization.
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Evaluación de la vulnerabilidad de sistemas eléctricos  
por medio de programación multinivel: una revisión bibliográfica
Resumen
Los estudios de vulnerabilidad pueden identificar elementos críticos 
en los sistemas de distribución de potencia eléctrica con el fin de tomar 
medidas de protección contra posibles escenarios que pueden resultar en 
desconexión de carga (también llamado deslastre de carga), que puede ser 
ocasionada por eventos naturales o ataques deliberados. Este artículo es 
una reseña bibliográfica sobre el segundo tipo de casos, es decir, los del 
problema de interdicción, en el que se asume la existencia de un agente 
disruptivo cuyo objetivo es maximizar los daños ocasionados al sistema 
mientras el operador de red actúa como agente de defensa del mismo. 
La interacción no simultánea de estos dos agentes crea un problema de 
optimización multinivel y en la bibliografía se reportan varios modelos 
de interdicción y soluciones para abordar el problema. La contribución 
principal de este artículo es la presentación de consideraciones que deben 
tomarse en cuenta para analizar, modelar y resolver el problema de la 
interdicción, incluyendo las soluciones, métodos y técnicas más comunes 
para solucionarlo, así como futuros estudios al respecto. Esta revisión 
encontró que la mayoría de la investigación en el tema se enfoca en el 
análisis de los sistemas de transmisión, considerando las aproximaciones 
lineales de la red; algunos estudios en interdicción usan un modelo 
AC de la red o tratan las redes de distribución directamente desde un 
enfoque multinivel. Algunos retos en este campo son el modelado y la 
inclusión de nuevas opciones de defensa para el operador de la red, como 
la generación distribuida, la respuesta a la demanda y la reconfiguración 
topológica del sistema.
Palabras clave: problema de interdicción; optimización multinivel; 
vulnerabilidad de sistemas eléctricos; resiliencia de sistemas eléctricos; 
optimización de sistemas eléctricos.
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INTRODUCTION
Electricity transmission and distribution systems are exposed to failures caused not 
only by nature but also by disruptive agents [1]. The effects of the latter kind of attacks 
have been historically evaluated using security analysis techniques, among which 
contingency analysis is a subset [2]. The traditional approach of security studies of 
power systems is based on N-1 or N-2 criteria and consists of ensuring that the system 
can continue operating normally, even if one or two elements are out of service [3].
Nevertheless, this approach cannot be applied to the modeling of simultaneous 
attacks of k elements because, in real systems, the number of combinations to be 
evaluated would be prohibitive [4]. Furthermore, current reliability policy and security 
standards for electric power systems around the world are limited to the analysis of a 
small set of events [5], and traditional reliability indices are not adequate to effectively 
plan for emerging dangers.
As a result, developing resilience indicators can help network planners to adequa-
tely budget the maintenance of the network and investments to improve its functionality 
in case of low-probability high-consequence risks [6]. 
In the technical literature, intentional attacks in which the disruptive agent delibe-
rately tries to maximize its damage to the system have been analyzed using multilevel 
interdiction models. A model is defined here as a set of equations, functions, and 
mathematical formulas that represent a particular phenomenon, in this case, the inter-
diction problem. Interdiction models generally implement a simplified representation of 
transmission networks. Such simplification, known as the DC model, is achieved using 
linear equations that represent the relationship between power injections and flows in 
the network. However, a few interdiction multilevel studies have used a more realistic 
representation of the network, i.e., an AC model. This is because using a DC model 
of the network facilitates the use of exact methods to solve the interdiction problem, 
while the AC model limits the solution methods to heuristic or meta-heuristic strategies. 
Network operators can adopt different strategies in the face of an attack. The most 
common of them is redispatch [1], [7], but other possibilities are modifying the topology 
of the network [8] or exploiting distributed generation (DG) to operate in isolation [9], 
which is the most widely used in distribution networks.
However, multiple reliability metrics that are generally accepted often exclude 
important interruptions caused by unexpected events; for instance, the Customer Ave-
rage Interruption Frequency Index (Caifi) and Customer Average Interruption Duration 
Index (Caidi). As a consequence, according to the existing reliability metrics, a highly 
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reliable power system may not necessarily be resilient. The objective of resilience is 
not only to withstand all possible disaster scenarios but also to have quick and efficient 
recovery measures [10].
The number of studies regarding the vulnerability of electric power systems has 
presented an important upward trend in recent years. A bibliometric analysis using the 
keywords power system vulnerability and power system security in the databases Science 










































Figure 2. Number of publications that include the term power system security (2006–2019). 
Source: own elaboration.
Although figure 1 and figure 2 present a similar trend of both keywords, the second 
case includes a much higher number of publications. For instance, in 2018, the number 
of vulnerability studies of power systems reached a total of 282 publications, while 
there were 1,451 security studies. It should be clarified that although there have been 
many vulnerability and security studies of power systems (as proven by our preliminary 
search in the databases above), only a small subset of them addresses the topic of 
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interest in this article. This literature review focuses on vulnerability studies of power 
systems, more specifically, those that include deliberate attacks and are modeled using 
multilevel programming.
This article is structured as follows. The first section introduces and defines 
concepts of vulnerability studies of power systems. The second section classifies these 
studies paying special attention to multilevel models. The third section describes future 
challenges, which consist of incorporating new defense options for network operators. 
Finally, the fourth section presents the conclusions. 
1. THE VULNERABILITY PROBLEM
In [11], the authors define vulnerability as the decrease in the performance of an elec-
trical network in the face of a disturbance and present a correlation analysis of different 
vulnerability metrics. In [12], the authors reviewed the literature on the resilience of 
power systems in order to face high-probability high-risk events. They associate the 
vulnerability problem of power systems with a specific triggering event. Therefore, 
defining the triggering event is the first step in a vulnerability analysis.
Vulnerability studies can be grouped by triggering events: random failures, natural 
threats, and malicious attacks [13].
Random failures are a series of triggering events that exhibit wide variations and 
uncertainty [14]. These failures can be modeled by (a) randomly eliminating a given 
part or number of components of a system; (b) assigning a failure probability to each 
component and then comparing that probability with a random number between zero 
and one uniformly distributed to assess the state of the component [15]; or (c) selecting, 
first, the number of defective components based on a given distribution and, then, 
randomly eliminating a set of components with the selected number [16].
The second type of vulnerability analysis considers natural threats such as 
earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, and thunderstorms [17]. These dangers can cause the 
components of a system distributed over an area of influence to fail simultaneously. 
The impact of these natural hazards on the components of a system is generally modeled 
using fragility curves. The latter show the probability of exceeding a certain threshold 
of damage, which is constrained by a selected danger intensity measurement, such as 
maximum acceleration of the terrain, maximum soil speed, permanent deformation 
of the ground for seismic dangers [18] or gust wind speed for hurricane dangers [19].
The third type is the analysis of vulnerability in the face of malicious attacks. In 
this case, on the one hand, a disruptive agent tries to maximize the damage to the system 
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by intentionally attacking some of its components [20]. On the other hand, the network 
operator minimizes the damage by redispatching or making topological changes to 
the network. Due to its action-reaction nature, the vulnerability to disruptive attacks 
is analyzed using multilevel optimization models [1].
Figure 3 presents a classification of events in electric power systems. Although 
the events due to internal failures were the most frequent (47.86 %), those caused by 
natural disasters, vandalism, and cyber attacks still resulted in 37.85 % of the total 
power cuts around the world from 1965 to 2012 [10]. This highlights the importance 















Figure 3. Occurrence of events in electric power systems (1965–2012).
Source: Adapted from [10].
2. CLASSIFICATION OF VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT APPROACHES
The specialized literature presents different approaches to analyze vulnerability. This 
section describes the conventional vulnerability analysis models and those that involve 
multilevel programming. 
2.1  Conventional vulnerability models
The conventional models of the vulnerability of electric power systems do not usually 
consider intentional attacks. Such models are focused on finding a set of critical elements 
that, if out of service, would cause the biggest problems to the system, whether in terms 
of load shedding, overloading of other elements, or technical aspects such as voltage 
stability issues [21]. In order to identify critical lines in a power system, the network 
can be modeled as a graph with links (transmission lines, transformers, etc.) and nodes 
(busbars, substations, etc.). This approach was proposed in [3] for a vulnerability 
analysis using what the authors call an improved maximum power flow. Similar studies 
[2], [22] rank critical lines in a context of safe and economical electricity dispatch. 
105Assessing the Vulnerability of Power Systems Using Multilevel Programming: A Literature Review
Revista Ingenierías Universidad de Medellín, 20(38) • Enero-Junio de 2021 • pp. 99-117 • ISSN (en línea): 2248-4094
In addition to power lines and transformers, substations and generators can also 
be critical elements in electric power systems. In [23] the authors considered substation 
failures that can occur sequentially and non-synchronously. In particular, they found 
that this kind of attacks generates many combinations, and these failures may cause 
large-size blackouts. Additionally, they proposed a metric called the sequential attack 
graph and a strategy based on such metric.
The vulnerability metrics in [24] are useful to implement guidelines to plan, 
design, invest in, and operate electricity networks. In countries such as China, 
studies have identified critical attack areas with three types of vulnerabilities, and 
a comparative analysis was conducted using vulnerability metrics under different 
tolerance parameters [25]. Likewise, a multidimensional vulnerability analysis was 
carried out based on given metrics and failure scenarios in order to identify critical 
areas from the topological and functional standpoints [26].
Another approach [4] combines traditional metrics based on the physical and 
operating characteristics of the network with two newly proposed metrics: entropic 
degree and network capacity. This approach can be used to evaluate the structural 
vulnerabilities of electric power systems.
The tolerance of electric power networks to contingencies has been analyzed in 
the context of complex network theory [27] by comparing the efficiency of the system 
with a newly defined parameter such as network capacity. The efficiency and capacity 
of the network are compared by estimating its vulnerability in terms of both metrics.
The effects of uncertain repair times and recovery resources after the interruption to 
the critical infrastructure are investigated in [28]. In that case, a restoration framework 
is applied to the British electric power system, and the results demonstrate the added 
value of using a stochastic model instead of a deterministic one.
Because electric power systems should reestablish their operation in the face of 
contingencies, the concept of resilience and their dimensions in distribution networks 
have also been studied. The methodology proposed in [29] is based on mixed-integer 
linear programming and an adequate evaluation of the resilience of smart distribution 
systems. Such model examines the formation of dynamic microgrids, their service 
areas, and the optimal management of different technologies, such as energy storage 
systems, demand management programs and distributed generation.
In [30], the authors proposed an improved model to study the reconfiguration of 
a distribution network based on a refined genetic algorithm. Their objective was to 
minimize the energy losses of the system.
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Another defense strategy based on planning is assigning resources to strengthen 
the electric power network in order to maximize its immunity against malicious attacks 
[31], not only by increasing the protection of the power system components but also 
by building redundant schemes [32].
Other authors have proposed simple critical interdiction strategies for transmission 
systems [33], [34]. Their method is based on a greedy algorithm in which the trans-
mission line with the highest load is interdicted at each iteration.
The effectiveness of protecting transmission lines identified as promising candida-
tes for interdiction has also been investigated. In [35], two typical models to evaluate 
the vulnerability of an electric power network were used under intentional attacks: a 
purely topological model and an interrelation-based model. Afterwards, their results 
were compared with a DC power flow model.
The inclusion of renewable energy sources on a large scale in distribution networks 
and its impact on vulnerability was modeled in [36] using a complex network based on 
a bidirectional flow that considered the change in topology and the power flow pattern 
in the smart grid.
2.2  Bilevel models
Multilevel models are based on the hypothesis that, on the one hand, there is an aggressor 
whose objective is to cause maximum damage to the system; and, on the other hand, 
an agent reacts to the disruptive actions, modifying its operating scheme in order to 
minimize the damages caused by the attack. This attack-defense relationship can be 
modeled using a bilevel programming structure (see figure 4.).
Figure 4. Bilevel model (attack-defense).
Source: Adapted from [37].
107Assessing the Vulnerability of Power Systems Using Multilevel Programming: A Literature Review
Revista Ingenierías Universidad de Medellín, 20(38) • Enero-Junio de 2021 • pp. 99-117 • ISSN (en línea): 2248-4094
In figure 4., the aggressor should determine an attack scheme that maximizes 
the damage to the network (measured in load shedding). For that purpose, it should 
consider the fact it has limited resources and anticipate the system operator’s response. 
From the viewpoint of game theory, this dynamic represents a Stackelberg competition 
[38]. In this type of games, there are a leader and a follower who have conflicting 
objectives. The leader should determine its game strategy by anticipating the possible 
reaction of the follower [39]. In addition, the objective function of the leader depends 
on the decision made by the follower. In the vulnerability problem, the leader is the 
aggressor and the value of its objective function (load shedding) depends on the network 
operator’s strategy.
The vulnerability problem under a bilevel programming scheme, also known 
as the terrorist threat problem, was first proposed in [7]. Later, the model in [7] was 
generalized in [1], thus allowing users to define different objective functions for both 
agents. In [40], the authors proposed minimum and maximum vulnerability models. 
The former aims to find a minimum number of elements to attack in order to cause a 
previously defined load shedding, while the latter aims to cause as much shedding as 
possible with a predetermined number of elements to attack.
Given the non-convexity intrinsic in multilevel programming models, some authors 
have adopted metaheuristics to address the vulnerability problem. In [41], the 
authors proposed a genetic algorithm (GA) to solve the interdiction problem considering 
the topological modification of the system an additional strategy for the network operator to 
minimize load shedding.
A hybrid GA that involves a local search was used in [42] to address the vulne-
rability problem in different demand and generation scenarios. In [43], the authors 
implemented an iterated local search (ILS) to solve the vulnerability problem modeling 
attacks to lines and generators. In [44], other authors compared different metaheuristics 
(including GA, ILS, taboo search, and Grasp) applied to the vulnerability problem of 
electric power systems. Benders decomposition, another numerical tool, has also been 
employed to deal with interdiction problems, as described in [45].
The vulnerability of power systems can also be analyzed using a specific time 
horizon. In [46], the authors presented a vulnerability analysis model that can be used 
to determine where and when (over a given horizon) a power system will be more 
vulnerable to intentional attacks. In this case, at the upper level of the optimization, the 
disruptive agent should determine an attack plan that includes the elements to attack 
and the best time for such attack. 
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The interdiction model presented in [44] identifies the attacks that have the 
biggest impact on the power network. The contribution of this model lies in the fact 
that it incorporates the impacts of the possible attack in the short term (seconds 
to minutes) and the long term (minutes to days). The medium-term impacts are 
examined using a DC optimal power flow (DCOPF) model. The short-term impacts 
are addressed by means of an interruption cascade analysis model that uses a set of 
verifiers sequentially applied.
A common characteristic among most vulnerability studies is the representation 
of the transmission network using a DC model. This simplifies the modeling of the 
problem and, as a result, a bilevel model can be transformed into a single-level equi-
valent. However, DC models do not consider the effect of reactive power and network 
voltage limits.
In turn, the interdiction model in [43] and [47] uses an AC model of the 
transmission network. Such model can produce more realistic results because it 
considers voltage limits, the contribution of the reactive power, and the losses at the 
transmission network elements. Another vulnerability model [48] implemented an 
AC model of the network and quantified the impact of the attacks to said network in 
different ways, including the deviation of the voltages at the busbars and the minimum 
load that should be eliminated in order to restore the network to a stable operation.
The integration of information technologies into power systems makes the latter 
vulnerable to cyber attacks. This type of attacks can even affect the service provision 
or the information of the control and protection systems by injecting fake data [49]. 
Possible scenarios of coordinated attacks can be found in the specialized literature. 
The power grid is becoming more vulnerable to various kinds of cyber and physical 
attacks. Coordination between the attacks could bring higher impacts on the power 
system, as evidenced by the 2015 Ukrainian power system cyberattack. There is 
limited study in existing literature about possible coordinated attack scenarios and 
the detailed mathematical modeling of them. To prevent future coordinated attacks 
against power systems, in this paper the cyber-physical security of the power system 
is analyzed and probable coordinated attack scenarios are proposed. In [50], the 
authors studied in detail two typical examples of attack coordination: (1) between 
the load redistribution (LR) attack and the attackers; and (2) between the LR attack 
and the attacked lines. Operators could be misled to develop an uninformed energy 
dispatch strategy and, as a result, load reduction could be maximized.
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2.3  Trilevel models
Trilevel vulnerability models contain the attack-defense bilevel scheme mentioned 
above and involve a third agent at the upper level of the optimization. The new agent 
is the network planner, who should make decisions about the construction of new 
reinforcements in order to minimize the impacts of eventual attacks. The attacker 
and system operator are on the second and third level, respectively. Figure 5. presents 
a scheme of the interaction between these agents. In this case, the system planner 
receives information about the lower-level problems based on which it makes decisions 
regarding network reinforcements.
Figure 5. Trilevel vulnerability model.
Source: Adapted from [37].
In other studies [6], [9], trilevel vulnerability models have been applied to distribution 
systems. In [6], the objective function was formulated as the load shedding cost, in 
addition to the operation cost of the generator. Furthermore, the trilevel problem can be 
broken down into two stages: master and slave problem. Dual transformation has been 
proposed [51], [52] the authors numerically validate and analyse the tri-level transmission 
expansion planning (TTEP) to turn the trilevel model into a single-level one, which 
ensures a global optimum. In [53], the objective function was the load shedding cost, 
and the authors proposed the conversion to a bilevel problem using the duality principle. 
Finally, they utilized Benders decomposition to solve the problem.
In [54], the model was focused on protecting the network against cyber-physical 
attacks from the viewpoint of the allotment of defense resources. A coordinated 
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attack means a physical short circuit of the transmission lines after hijacking the 
communication network of the safety relays. A systematic review of interaction 
models and solution methods in studies of the interaction between cyber-networks 
and power systems was presented in [49]. In turn, unidentifiable attacks produced by 
cyber attacks (wrong readings of meters) were considered in the reliability evaluation 
of power systems in [55]. More cyber technologies are being deployed in the modern 
cyberphysical power systems. However, as a result higher cyberattack risks will be 
brought about. Unidentifiable attacks, which are a type of emerging false data injection 
attacks, could affect the outcomes of State Estimation (SE).
In [56], a trilevel vulnerability model was implemented using an algorithm that 
generates columns and restrictions. The results showed that the protection using the 
optimal solution of the defender-attacker-defender model always enabled the network to 
survive in case of contingencies. Some defense strategies studied in the literature include 
the formation of DG islands and the reconfiguration of the network [9]. The model in 
[57] introduced multiple sets of uncertainty to characterize possible interruptions caused 
by attackers, and the probabilities of the multiple sets of uncertainty were estimated by 
means of an analytic hierarchy process.
Another perspective on vulnerability evaluation [13] aims to mitigate the 
vulnerability of the power system to the worst attacks located in space. These attacks 
are defined as the failure of a group of system components distributed over an area due 
to natural dangers or malicious attacks, while other components outside that area do 
not fail directly.
Regarding the allotment of resources for the defense or reinforcement of an electric 
power network, other authors [37] have proposed a two-stage solution approach that 
achieves optimization with a moderate computational effort. The original trilevel 
program is transformed, first, into an equivalent bilevel program, which is later solved 
using an implicit enumeration algorithm.
Table 1 presents a classification of the literature reviewed in this paper specifying 
the type of network model, solution method and defense strategies modeled for the 
network operator. 
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Table 1. Multilevel programming studies applied to the vulnerability problem  





system Model Solution method Defense strategies
Bilevel Trilevel Dist. Transm. AC DC Exact Heuristic
[1] X X X X Redispatch
[5] X X X X Redispatch
[6] X X X X Planning
[7] X X X X Planning
[8] X X X X Redispatch
[9] X X X X Reconfiguration/Islanding
[37] X X X Planning
[40] X X X X Redispatch
[41] X X X X Reconfiguration
[42] X X X X Planning
[43] X X X X Redispatch
[44] X X X X Redispatch
[45] X X X X Planning
[47] X X X X Planning
[48] X X X X Reconfiguration
[51] X X X X Planning
[52] X X X X Planning
[53] X X X X Planning
[54] X X X X Planning
[57] X X X X Reconfiguration
[58] X X X X Planning
Source: own elaboration.
2.4  Future research
Future studies to solve the interdiction problem are connected to multiple fields. They 
include new formulations of mixed-integer linear programming models that represent 
the interdiction problem and integrate primary control actions in a single level, as 
proposed in [1], or incorporate uncertainty into terrorist objectives [7]. Other proposals 
introduce alternative solution techniques based on heuristics [8], [41].
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Nevertheless, multilevel models need greater detail in the modeling of power 
systems, which involves more complex solution methods that could be considered in 
future work; for instance, the use of genetic operators in the metaheuristic applications 
[5]; stochastic programming to model the load, generation, and topology of the network 
[6]; and linear approximations of the min-max model, as proposed in [7]. Other studies 
seek to optimize computational calculation times [5], [9]. Finally, some defense 
strategies are the connection or disconnection of fast-acting generating units [8], [41], 
the mitigation of consequences of attacks (cascading outages, temporary stability, etc.) 
[7], and network reinforcement based on planning and considering stochasticity and 
distributed generation [9].
3. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presented a review of the literature on the vulnerability problem in power 
systems. Such review was mainly focused on the description of bi- and trilevel 
programming models. Bilevel models represent attack-defense dynamics between a 
disruptive agent and the network operator, while their trilevel counterparts involve the 
network planner and represent defense-attack-defense dynamics.
The studies we retrieved were classified based on their solution method, network 
model, and type of system. This review found that most vulnerability or interdiction 
studies were focused on the analysis of transmission systems. That is because attacks to 
distribution systems have less serious consequences regarding the load level and number 
of affected users. Most authors adopted a simplified network model, i.e., a DC model, 
to represent the transmission network, which enabled them to solve the problem using 
exact techniques based on mixed-integer linear programming. In addition, the studies 
that implemented an AC model of the network adopted heuristic methods to solve the 
vulnerability problem. The defense strategies in bilevel problems were redispatch or 
network reconfiguration. In turn, trilevel models considered network reinforcements 
to be the core defense strategy against eventual attacks.
This literature review also revealed future research lines to analyze the vulnerability 
of power systems. They include new mathematical formulations to achieve more accurate 
representations of the network; the introduction of uncertainty to model the system 
load and generation; new (heuristic and exact) solution techniques and novel defense 
strategies for network operators and planners that incorporate the effects of demand 
response, distributed generation and energy storage programs.
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